Mississippi College Law Review Selects Articles for Publication in Volume 43

Last week, the Mississippi College Law Review hosted its annual Publication Awards Banquet.  The Review honored its graduating members at the banquet and announced the second-year staff writers selected for publication in Volume 43.  While Volume 43 is not set to be released until 2025, the authors slated for publication have graciously agreed to write this blog to tell the public a little bit about themselves and offer an abstract for their articles pending publication.  The Reviewextends its deepest congratulations to these 2L members and a special thank you for their willingness to write this blog.

Best Casenote Award: Emily Hurst

My name is Emily Hurst, and I am a 2L at Mississippi College School of Law.  I am from Shreveport, Louisiana, and I attended Mississippi State University as an undergrad.  In addition to my involvement in the Student Federal Bar Association, Women’s Student Bar Association, and Dean’s Ambassadors, I will serve as Production Editor for Volume 43 of the Mississippi College Law Review.  I am also a writing fellow for Professor Taylor White’s Legal Analysis and Communications class and a teaching assistant for Professor Frank Rosenblatt’s Constitutional Law class.

My advisor for this Casenote was Professor Donald Campbell, who introduced me to this case and provided invaluable insight into the issues surrounding this area of law. His Wills and Trusts class piqued my interest in this topic and set the groundwork for this Note. I owe him a great deal of gratitude not only for his guidance on this Note but also for his dedication to the school and professionalism, which have inspired me since my 1L year. 

Hitt v. Hart: The Dangers of Minimizing a Testator’s Video Testimony”

 An inherent issue in wills cases is that the person who could prove the validity of a will with absolute certainty – the testator – is dead by the time the will is contested.  In today’s technological age, a potential aid for this issue is a video of the testator explaining her dispositions.  However, in Hitt v. Hart, the Mississippi Court of Appeals largely ignored such a video and relied on testimony from other family members to invalidate a will for undue influence.

            The testator in Hitt approached her attorney and explained that she wanted to disinherit all but one of her children.  Knowing the strong likelihood that the disinherited children would contest the will, the attorney required a cooling-off period for the testator and created a video in which the testator explained her wishes.  I do not suggest that this video should have automatically validated the will, but rather, I propose that the video itself should be examined for undue influence first.  If no undue influence is found in the creation of the video, courts should demand that it be considered at all stages of the overall undue influence analysis or that the burden shifts back to the contesting party to prove undue influence. 

Publication Award & Best Comment: Allison Dooling

My name is Allison Dooling, and I am honored to be considered for publication in Volume 43.  Prior to starting law school, I pursued my education in finance.  I find the financial world fascinating, and I love any opportunity to combine my interest in finance with my passion for the law – as readers will likely be able to tell from my article.

Professor Taylor White played a crucial role as my advisor for this article.  I cannot thank her enough for her assistance and encouragement through this process.  As a professor in the Legal Writing department, she was able to help me from brainstorming to final editing (and everywhere in between).  Her creative advice and guidance helped me craft a paper that is informative, accessible, and hopefully entertaining.

“Using Political Privilege to Profit: Insider Trading in the Government and S. 2463’s Alleged Attempt to Stop It”

Insider trading is generally illegal within the United States.  However, members of Congress are notorious for regularly engaging in stock trades based on government information that mirrors insider trading.  In 2023, Senators Gillibrand and Hawley proposed a bill, unlike any such proposed before, to put an ultimate ban on government insider trading: the “Ban Stock Trading for Government Officials Act” or S. 2463.

On its face, S. 2463 appears to address the criticisms surrounding government insider trading.  It not only increases regulation and reporting standards but also bans government officials, their spouses, and their dependents from owning any stock during their term of service. Upon deeper inspection, though, it is clear that the Bill is a farce to placate the American public. S. 2463 contains a loophole that allows officials to trade ETFs and mutual funds and enables them to continue insider trading at the market segment level.

Publication Award: Thomas Jones

My name is Thomas Jones, and I am a second-year student from Cleveland, Mississippi. I will serve as the Editor-in-Chief for Volume 43 of the Mississippi College Law Review.  Aside from Law Review, I actively participate in the Student Federal Bar Association and the Phoenix Club of Jackson.  I also currently serve as a teaching assistant for Professor Phillip McIntosh’s Torts class and Professor Lee Francis’s Civil Procedure class.

Professor Donald Campbell was my advisor for the writing of this casenote, to whom I owe a special thank you. Professor Campbell not only inspired me to write on this case but also offered me his in-depth knowledge of the particular area of law. Without his guidance, I can say that I would not have reached the finish line.

“Liening on the Court: Examining Loblolly Properties, LLC. v. Le Papillon Homeowner’s Association, Inc.,and the Future of Lien Priority in Mississippi.”

The Mississippi Supreme Court in Loblolly Properties, LLC v. Le Papillon Homeowner’s Association, Inc. held that the nonjudicial foreclosure of a deed of trust does not extinguish restrictive covenants to pay HOA fees that were filed after the recording of the deed of trust.  In doing so, the Court blatantly disregarded the fundamental understanding of lien priority in Mississippi, and also failed to explain how the policy behind lien priority would further be upheld in the future.

This decision by the Supreme Court is incorrect and places Mississippi in a “super-minority” of jurisdictions on this issue.  The overwhelming majority of courts who have ruled on facts similar to Loblolly have all held contrary to that of the Supreme Court.  This Article examines the holding and analysis of the court in Loblolly and offers an explanation as to why the court found the way it did.  Finally, this Article lays out the direct consequences of the court’s holding and presents several solutions as to how the Court may remedy this disastrous precedent.

Publication Award: McLeod Johnson

My name is McLeod Johnson, and I am from Morton, Mississippi.  I am a second-year student at Mississippi College School of Law and am greatly honored to serve as an Executive Editor for Volume 43 of the Review.  My academic pursuits are centered around business and commercial litigation. I am an active member of the Federalist Society and the Christian Legal Society while also serving as incoming treasurer for the Oil & Gas Society.

I am deeply indebted to Dr. Taylor White, who served as my Law Review casenote advisor.  Her skill and expertise guided me in the right direction even when challenging questions arose.  Without her immense help, I would not have been able to complete this undertaking.

“Divine Detachment: Beachy v. Assemblies of God and a New Interpretation of the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine”

In the landmark case of Beachy v. Mississippi District Council for Assemblies of God, the Mississippi Supreme Court redefined its interpretation of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine—marking a pivotal shift in church-state jurisprudence.  Traditionally, this doctrine instructed courts to defer to the highest internal authority of a church when deciding disputes within hierarchical religious organizations.  However, the court’s decision in Beachy significantly departed from this principle by designating the local pastor and congregation as the supreme authority over local church affairs, even within a hierarchical structure.

This Casenote explores the profound implications of the Supreme Court’s ruling, focusing on its impact on church autonomy and the broader legal landscape.  Although the Beachy Dissent reached a more technically accurate interpretation of the doctrine, the Majority pursued a socially conscientious application more favorable from a public policy standpoint.  This Note analyzes how the majority’s approach benefits local churches and denominational hierarchies, fostering local church autonomy and leading to increased (rather than decreased) denominational affiliation.  This Note also examines how the court’s decision protects minority religious beliefs from encroaching religious monopolies and simplifies courts’ application of the doctrine while safeguarding religious denominations’ property rights. Time will tell, however, whether the court’s decision truly detached the Mississippi judiciary from religion or instead serves to sacrifice impartiality on the altar of autonomy.

Publication Award: Matthew Matherne

Hey there!  I am Matthew Matherne, a second-year law student from Monroe, Louisiana. I currently serve on the executive board of the Mississippi College Law Review and the Civil Law Society.  I enjoy the unique challenges that accompany law school, and writing an article for Volume 43 of the Review has been no exception.

I want to thank my advisor, Professor Lee Francis, for sharing both his knowledge and encouragement while writing my case note. I also want to thank the Mississippi College Law Review senior members for their feedback and guidance throughout the writing process.

“A Dangerous Challenge to the Constitutionality of the Felon-In-Possession Statute: United States v. Bullock”

In United States v. Bullock, Judge Carlton Reeves, in the Southern District of Mississippi, held that the federal felon-in-possession statute was unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Bullock.  Although Mr. Bullock had been previously convicted of multiple violent felonies involving a firearm, including one that resulted in the death of an individual, Judge Reeves dismissed the charges because the government failed to establish a historical tradition of prohibiting felons from possessing firearms.  Judge Reeves’ determination that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Bullock is a decision that is not only “dangerous” to society, but it contradicts the historical tradition of firearm regulation in America.

The landmark United States Supreme Court case of New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen outlined the framework that governs challenges to firearms regulations.  The Bruen test dictates that “when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.  To justify its regulation . . . the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”

This Article, through an application of the test set forth in Bruen, explains why there is ample historical support for prohibiting dangerous individuals such as Mr. Bullock from possessing firearms.  Furthermore, by analyzing the text of the Second Amendment, the methodology outlined in Bruen, and exploring historically analogous regulations, this Article substantiates the applicability of § 922(g)(1) to individuals with violent felony convictions. Considering Mr. Bullock’s multiple gun-related violent felonies, his challenge, and others like it, should not defeat the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).

Publication Award: Will Kennedy

My name is Will Kennedy, and this fall, I will serve as the Articles Editor during my last year of school. As a Jackson native invested in Mississippi’s success, I am deeply committed to contributing to its growth and development.  I appreciate the opportunities that MC Law has given me, including the opportunity to work on this paper.  However, I could not have done it without the help of my advisor.  Professor Taylor White advised me throughout the writing process, and I am extremely grateful for that.  Her attention to detail and practical experience were invaluable in shortening my long nights.  She is an incredible asset to MC Law, and I am proud to have worked with her.

“Auer Deference: He Who Writes a Law Must Not Adjudge Its Violation”

This comment explores Auer’s deference generally and its application to the Sentencing Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission, and its commentary on the Guidelines.  Auer deference, in its simplest form, requires courts to give controlling weight to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.  Following the Court’s decision in Kisor, which expressly limited Auer’s application, the circuit courts have disagreed on the applicability of Auer to the Sentencing Commission’s commentary regarding career offender designation.  This disagreement begs for an appearance before the Court of Last Resort, but until that day, the courts must rigidly apply Kisor to deference cases.  A stricter application will prevent administrative agencies from circumventing notice-and-comment procedures, conforming to the traditional canons of construction, and promoting clarity in rulemaking for the benefit of the public.